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Ethical Guidance for a Grander Jury
ANNA OFFIT*

INTRODUCTION

Students and scholars of law, as well as practitioners, have expressed differing
views concerning the federal and state grand jury, its procedures, ethical rules,
and even its very existence. Some have called for the grand jury's abolition,'
others have argued for its reform in light of the realities of the criminal justice
system,2 and still others have advocated for measures that would restore the
grand jury to its "historical" function as an independent, accusatory body
representing the concerns of members of its surrounding community.'
Variability both in exculpatory evidence and grand jury secrecy practices in
different states reflects ambiguity in the. ethical rules and highlights the
transformed role of the grand jury system. A significant cost of this transformed
role, however, is a sense of alienation and confusion among grand jurors, many of
whom feel uncertain about their responsibilities during grand jury service.
Changes in the grand jury's role prompted by increases in plea bargaining, for
instance, do not figure into grand jury training, leaving grand jurors to operate
under the mistaken impression that every one of the defendants they vote to indict
will face trial.4
There is consensus among grand jurors as well as prosecutors and scholars
who have worked with them, that the inadequacy of grand juror training is more
than a speculative concern.' To date, the ethical rules have not addressed the

* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (expected, May 2012); M.Phil, University of Cambridge (2009);
A.B., Princeton University (2008). The author expresses gratitude to Professors J.A. Laidlaw and Carol
Greenhouse, and Judge Gregory Mize, who offered encouragement and advice during key stages of this
research. The author is also indebted to Professors Susan Brenner, Angela Davis, Roger Fairfax, Justin
Levinson, Kevin Washburn, Joseph Bowman, Steve Bunnell, and Mary Vogel.
1. See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2354 (2008) (citing
scholarship supporting the abolition of the grand jury).
2. See, e.g., ROGER A. FAIRFAX, JR., GRAND JuRY 2.0 (2010) [hereinafter GRAND JuRY 2.0]; Thaddeus
Hoffmeister, The Grand Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting the Grand Jury's Shield, 98 J. CiiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1202 (2007-2008).
3. See Washburn, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the historical balance of grand jury power should be restored
in favor of jurors rather than the prosecutor). See generally United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with State Grand Juror, Recent Coll. Graduate (Aug. 5, 2009) (noting a
grand juror she served with would frequently say, on.the assumption that every case would go to trial, 'That's
for the jury to decide; let's not worry about that right now"); Telephone Interview with State Grand Juror,
Practicing Attorney (Aug. 11, 2009) (recalling, "We heard a hundred drug cases and we sent every single one of
them to trial").
5. See infra note 109.
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dilemma posed by jurors' systematic misunderstanding of their roles and
responsibilities in light of the rapid changes experienced by the grand jury
system.
Section I of this Note explores the extent to which the American Bar
Association (ABA) Practice Guide, and similar major ethical conventions and
advisory opinions, present competing interpretations of the grand jury's role in
the criminal justice system. The lack of prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory
evidence, grand jury secrecy, and the abundance of plea negotiations demonstrate
how historicized visions of the grand jury are appropriated to serve distinct
conceptions of the institution's proper role. Section II offers a historical narrative
of the grand jury that places grand jurors' "local knowledge" and experience at
the heart of an inherently interpretive and evaluative enterprise. Section III
addresses recent proposals for grand jury reform that create a more juror-centered
and autonomy-emphasizing vision of the grand jury system. Drawing on
interviews with grand jurors, prosecutors, and legal scholars who have experience with state and federal grand juries, Section IV highlights an aspect of grand
jury process that is deserving of closer study: the absence of adequate training for
grand jurors.
In light of grand jurors' concerns about their ill-defined responsibilities in the
shifting institution of the grand jury, this Note concludes in Section V with a
proposal thatjudicial(rather than prosecutorial) oversight play a more active role
in rendering the grand jury intelligible to its jurors.
I. HISTORICIZED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE TRANSFORMED GRAND JURY
One impediment to honest discourse on grand jury procedure (and the prospect
of improving it) is the risk that under the pretense of faithfully conforming to
"historical" practice, the grand jury will not be able to adjust to the demands
posed by national security concerns and the increased incidence of plea
negotiation to resolve disputes. 6 Debate surrounding a prosecutor's obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence highlights a key tension that figures into these
debates: was the historical grand jury more or less autonomous than the one in
existence now? And how do issues of prosecutorial and judicial oversight
enhance or undermine this autonomy? As will be shown here, narratives of grand
jury history are frequently deployed to advance legal scholars' conceptions of
how grand jury procedure ought to be modified.
Irrespective of one's critical lens, however, there is consensus that the role of
the grand jury is experiencing a process of rapid and accelerating change.

6. See, e.g., MARY VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS AND THE MAKING OF

PoLmcALAUTHoRIY 94-95 (2007).
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A. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
The ABA's Ethics Practice Guide presents two dramatically different approaches to the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to
exculpatory evidence. The contradiction embodied in the ABA's ethics practice
guide will serve as a point of departure for a broader theoretical examination of
arguments that have dominated discussions of grand jury reform. On the one
hand, prosecutors are required to disclose "substantial evidence" to grand jurors
and cannot "knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to
negate guilt or mitigate the offense." 7 The requirement that prosecutors disclose
exculpatory evidence is also found in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,8
which apply to prosecutors' dealings with grand juries, as well as the ABA
Standardsfor CriminalJustice,9 and the U.S. Supreme Court's 1963 holding in
Brady v. Maryland.o
On the other hand, in a passage that follows immediately after the ABA's
Ethics Practice Guide's recommendation, conflicting Supreme Court precedent is
cited with respect to the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence "in
his function as advisor to a grand jury."n The guideline continues:
[I]n U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), the Supreme Court held that there is
no federal constitutional requirement that a prosecutor present even substantial
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. The court reasoned that requiring
prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury would alter the
grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body. 12

7. LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PRACTICE GUIDE § 61:613; ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.6 [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; 7 DOJ MANUAL § 9-11.233 (Supp. 1992);
NATiONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 58.4 (2d ed. 1991).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8 (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (discussing "Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," amended in February 1990 to note: "[T]he prosecutor in a criminal case
shall . .4(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense. . . ").
9. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.11 ("(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally
fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence
or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused."); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.6
("(b) No prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or
mitigate the offense.").
10. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor was required to disclose
evidence that an accomplice confessed to the homicide the defendant was being tried for).
11. See Donald J. Rose, ProsecutorialMisconduct, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1067 (1993).
12. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). Under Williams prosecutors are not required to
present exculpatory evidence even in cases where such evidence is "substantial." See generally Chariton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); John Bourdeaux, Jr., Glenda K. Harad & Alan Weinstein, Duty to Presentor Obtain
Evidence Favorableto Accused, 38A C.J.S. Grand Juries § 198 (2010).
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Unlike the ABA Practice Guide's requirement that "substantial" exculpatory
evidence be disclosed to grand jurors, the Williams decision held that a
prosecutor did not even have an obligation to present "substantial" exculpatory
evidence to a grand. jury, asserting that "lower courts lack sufficient supervisory
authority over grand juries to prescribe standards of prosecutorial conduct"
independent of those already required by the Supreme Court."
Of particular interest in the Williams opinion is Justice Scalia's characterization of a grand jury with judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion as
antithetical to its proper "historical role."' Though critiqued as unsound based
on the requirement of the grand jury to serve under the authority of the court that
convenes it, Justice Scalia's assertion reflects a historicized mode of inquiry
that will be revisited in Section III.
In a 2009 ethics opinion, the ABA acknowledged the apparent incongruity
between a prosecutor's constitutional obligations and the requirements of state
and local ethics guidelines. "Despite the importance of prosecutors fully
understanding the extent of the separate obligations imposed by Rule 3.8(d)," the
opinion stated, "few judicial opinions, or state or local ethics opinions, provide
guidance in interpreting the various state analogs to the rule."' 6 Rather than
incorporate the constitutional ethical standard advanced in Brady, Rule 3.8(d)
creates an "independent" standard more rigorous than the constitutional one.' 7
Ambiguity in the federal ethical rules with respect to prosecutorial discretion
results in a division among state grand juries: those that follow Scalia's Williams
characterization, and those that impose an obligation on prosecutors to disclose
certain forms of exculpatory evidence. An informal survey of twenty-three states
using grand juries reveals that while a majority permit prosecutors to withhold
exculpatory evidence from grand jurors, nine states (Alaska, Arizona, California,
Massachusetts, North Dakota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Utah)
require that such information be presented to jurors.
In addition to the resulting inconsistent practices among different jurisdictions,
one can also query the extent to which ambiguity in the ethical guidelines equips
grand jurors to understandtheir evidentiary entitlements in the grand jury room.
Do states that permit grand jurors to request presentations of exculpatory

13. See ABA STANDARDs, supra note 7, at 1087.
14. PAUL S. DIAMoND, 1-9 FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9.01 (4th ed. 2001).

15. Id. ("Justice Scalia's reading of grand jury history is simply wrong. It has long been the law that 'a grand
jury has no existence aside from the court which calls it into existence and upon which it is attending.' It is the
court alone that has the authority to convene a grand jury, whether 'regular' or 'special."') (citing O'Bryan v.
Chandler, 249 E Supp. 51, 55 (N.D. Okla. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
926); see FED. R. CluM. P. 6(a); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2011).
16. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, 1 (2009). The opinion also points out that the scope of ethics rules are rarely
addressed by courts in criminal litigation and that "disciplinary authorities rarely proceed against prosecutors in
cases that raise interpretive questions under Rule 3.8(d)." Id.
17. Id. at 4.
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States with No (or
Limited) Requirement
to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence 18

States that Give
Grand Jurors Discretion
to Hear Some
Exculpatory Evidence 19

States that Require
Prosecutors to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence 20

Delaware

Arkansas

Alaska

Illinois

Kentucky

Arizona

Indiana
Maryland
Minnesota
New Hampshire
Ohio
Rhode Island
Texas

Nevada
Oregon
South Dakota

California
Massachusetts
North Dakota
New Jersey
New York
Oklahoma
Utah

evidence, for instance, provide jurors with the training necessary to understand
what this entails? 21 After all, the ability to request that prosecutors provide
evidence that might weaken their case is of little use to grand jurors who are
unaware of the extent of their discretion or how to exercise it. 2 2
B. CHANGES IN GRAND JURY SECRECY PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
Much like discussions of prosecutorial discretion, scholarly writing on the
disclosure of grand jury proceedings frequently begins with reference to the

18. People v. Beu, 644 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Wurster v. State, 708 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999); State v. Deleon, 795 A.2d 776, 788 (Md. 2002); State v. Oikon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 109 (Minn. 1980);
State v. Hall, 877 A.2d 222 (N.H. 2005).
19. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-511 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-1106 (2005); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 172.145 (2005); Ky. R. CRm. P. 5.08 (2005); Guy v. Kentucky, No. 2002-SC-000412-MR, 2004 WL 102512,

at *4 (Ky. Jan. 2, 2004).
20. See, e.g., Carnerson v. State, 171 P.3d 1154, 1156 (Alaska 2007); State v. Delacadena, No. 1 CA-CR *
08-0059, 2010 WL 25041, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2010) (holding a prosecutor is only required to disclose
evidence to grand jury that is "clearly exculpatory"); Berardi v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170 (4th Dist.
2007); Cal. Penal Code §939.71 (2005); Corn. v. Blaslucci, 806 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); N.D.
Cent. Code §29-10.1-27 (2005); State v. Deiko, 2010 WL 668766, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 26,
2010); People v. Rodriguez, 9 Misc.3d 1127(A), 2005 WL 3001547, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (noting that New
York has always required prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence); 22 Ok. Stat. Ann. §335 (2005);
Strehl v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 558 P.2d 597 (Utah 1976); Utah Code Ann. §77-1Oa-13(5) (2005).
21. Telephone Interview with Susan Brenner, Assoc. Dean and Professor of Law, Univ. of Dayton Sch. of
Law (Jan. 21, 2011).
22. Id.
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"longstanding tradition" of grand jury secrecy. 23 In the years following September 11, 2001, however, secrecy rules have been adjusted so that the federal
government now employs the grand jury as a powerful instrument for combating
terrorism. The USA PATRIOT Act, for example, changed Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow the grand jury to disclose
information involving "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence ... or foreign
intelligence information. .. to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist
the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties." 24
A significant consequence of this change was the removal of procedures that once
required prosecutors to give notice to courts about information they disclosed,
and imposed limits on the uses of such information by prosecutors.2 5 Indeed, the
language of the Act itself, including the phrase "foreign intelligence information"
has raised concern among legal scholars that no meaningful restrictions have
been placed on the nature of the information encompassed by such a broad
definition.26
Of greater concern to legal scholars, including Professor Lori Shaw, is the extent to
which the Patriot Act provisions appear to undermine a tradition of grand jury
secrecy that has been "revered and protected for centuries."2 7 She writes:
The Patriot [Act] intelligence exception creates a material breach of the
protection afforded grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment. The failure to
require a showing of particularized need and the failure to require judicial
supervision create a situation in which enormous numbers of disclosures can,
have, and will be made. The cumulative effect of these disclosures will be to
chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic
injury to the grand jury process.2 8
With the intention of aggressively combating terrorist threats to the United States,
information with little relation to "national security" objectives can now be

23. See generally Elizabeth G. Serio, Note, Dangerous Precedent: The Consequences of Allowing
ProsecutorialDisregardof GrandJury Secrecy, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1011, 1011 (2008); see also FED. R.
Clm. P. 6(d)(1) (stating that only jurors, government attorneys, testifying witnesses, court reporters, and
stenographers can be present during grand jury proceedings); FED. R. Clum. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (imposing a secrecy
requirement on all who are present during grand jury proceedings).
24. See Sarah Sun Beale & James E. Felman, Enlisting and Deploying FederalGrand Juries in the War on
Terrorism, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 2, at 8 (citing Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)).
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 9; see also Lori E. Shaw, The USA PATRIOTAct of 2001, The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
PreventionAct of 2004, and the False Dichotomy Between ProtectingNational Security and PreservingGrand
Jury Secrecy, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 495, 511 (2005).

27. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 531.
28. Id. at 550-51.
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disclosed without judicial supervision, thus expanding the "intelligence" gathering and sharing capacity of the grand jury.2 9
Others, however, approach the issue of grand jury secrecy as one of the
greatest impediments to its perceived fairness and legitimacy. Calling for the
reform of the grand jury, many scholars argue that transparency in criminal
proceedings results in a more widespread perception of justice that accompanies
greater opportunity for public scrutiny. 30 Though grand juries "may depend on
secrecy to operate effectively," John Gibeaut writes, "that same secrecy also
means few Americans-lawyers included-really know what happens behind the
closed doors."
Less common topics of reflection are grand jurors' experiences with and
attitudes toward issues of grand jury secrecy. Though grand jurors are told not to
share details of cases or deliberation outside their chambers, instruction on other
aspects of grand juror conduct may be absent altogether. What would happen, for
example, if a grand juror decided to take out her laptop during deliberation to do
some research of her own? What if a grand juror used a Blackberry or iPad to
research how other jurisdictions dealt with prosecution of the same defendant? 32
For trial jurors, the use of technology to conduct outside research is improper; as
an impartial body, trial jurors are limited to consideration of the evidence that is
presented to them.3 As an investigative body imbued with the subpoena power to
compel witnesses to testify before them, however, the issue of whether grand
jurors understand the limits of their collection and exchange of research materials
is currently unresolved. 34 In addition to having limited understanding of
exculpatory evidence and grand jury secrecy requirements, many jurors have an
inaccurate (and uncorrected) impression of the frequency with which indictments
lead to trials.3

29. Id. at 551-52.
30. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, The True Goals of the Modem Grand Jury-and How to Achieve Them, in
GRAND JuRY 2.0, supra note 2, at 244 (citing Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72
(1980) ("The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no
community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a corner [or] in any covert manner."')).
31. See generally John Gibeaut, Indictment of a System, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2001, at 34,36 (2001).
32. See Brenner interview, supranote 21.
33. See Susan Brenner, GrandJurors,Technology and JurorMisconduct, CYB3RCRIM3 (Jan. 1,2010, 9:01
AM), http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2010/01/grand-jurors-technology-and-juror.html (quoting Pratt v. St.
Christopher's Hospital, 866 A.2d 313, 544 (Pa. 2005)) ("When jurors conduct their own experiments ... , the
result is the introduction of facts that have not been subject to the rules of evidence or to cross-examination by
either party.").
34. Id.
35. Interestingly, when thirty-four judicial and United States Attorney's Office interns were given an
anonymous survey that asked, "What percentage of people charged with a federal crime go to trial," only two
guessed a figure lower than 5 percent. Intern surveys (June 25, 2010) (on file with author).
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C. THE EFFECT OF THE INCREASING INCIDENCE OF PLEA BARGAINING ON
THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE GRAND JURIES
Plea bargaining is another phenomenon that is arguably in tension with the
grand jury's "historical" role as an investigative rather than adjudicative body.
Despite extensive media attention to litigation, full jury trials are the exception
rather than the rule. Between 90 and 95 percent of all convictions in the United
States are plea-bargained before ever reaching a trial.3 6 In 2009, for instance, out
of the 81,370 criminal cases brought to federal district courts, 96.3 percent were
resolved by guilty pleas with a mere 3.7 percent going to trial. Federal
prosecutors have suggested that even the 96 percent figure may be misleading
since "plea offer and some plea negotiation ... is also part of just about every
federal case that goes to trial."
Many critics of plea bargaining focus on defendants' perverse incentives to
plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, 39 as well as the discretion afforded to
prosecutors to strategically induce guilty pleas by bringing excessive or
ill-founded charges.4 0 Several studies and a recent documentary series depict
inmates who have maintained their innocence for at least one (if not all) of the
charges brought against them but proceeded to enter guilty pleas at the urging of
their defense attorneys.4 A recent analysis of federal criminal cases suggests that

36. See Vogel, supra note 6, at 3.
37. U.S. SENTENCING COAMSSION, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIsTICs, Table 11,

available athttp://ftp.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/Tablell.pdf, May 28, 2010 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) ("[T]he
rate of plea negotiation in U.S. district courts increased in 2009 from 95.8 percent in 2007 and 2008 and 94.5
percent in 2005.").
38. See Mary P. Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: ProsecutorialPerspectives on Federal
Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 1063, 1064 (2006) (noting that plea
bargaining is "a defining, if not the defining, feature of the present federal criminal justice system").
39. See, e.g., Jack Kamerman, The Social ConstructionofResponsibility, in NEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILrrY IN
THE CRMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEM 4 (Jack Kamerman ed., 1998) (noting that plea bargaining can result in the
conviction of the innocent for whom "pleading guilty to a lesser charge [is] preferable to being steamrollered
into conviction on a more serious charge").
40. See, e.g., id. at 156; G.M. Sykes, Cases, Courts, and Congestion, in LAW INCULTURE AND SocIETY 331
(Laura Nader ed., 1969) (A number of legal scholars and social scientists underscore the problems of the
"deal-making atmosphere" of plea bargaining by which offenders plead guilty in return for a reduction in the
"seriousness of the charge" or the "length of the recommended sentence"); Andrew D. Leipold, Prosecutorial
ChargingPracticesand GrandJury Screening: Some EmpiricalObservations, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 2,
at 207 (arguing that prosecutors introduce excessive secondary charges as bargaining chips to induce pleas from
defendants who might not necessarily be proven guilty at trial); Jacqueline E. Ross, The EntrenchedPosition of
PleaBargainingin United States Legal Practice,54 Am. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006) ("[T]he overbreadth of criminal
statutes ... makes it possible to charge one course of conduct under a multiplicity of overlapping legal
descriptions. One effect of this overbreadth is that prosecutors may exploit the discretion to choose among
overlapping charges by manipulating post-trial charges (i.e. overcharging the case to set post-trial sentences
higher ...).").
41. See, e.g., The Plea, PBS FRONTLNE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea (last visited
Mar. 29, 2011) (describing the case of thirty-year-old single mother Erma Stewart of Hearne, Texas, who pled
guilty to a narcotics charge she was not responsible for, due to poor legal advice from defense counsel and
coercion by the prosecutor. The confidential informant who provided evidence for the charges brought against
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"the widespread use of multiplicitous charges" may account for the fact that rates
of dismissal increase as the "seriousness" of the charges brought against a
defendant decrease.4 2 Aside from the potential for abuse, however, the prevalence of plea bargaining transforms the grand jury's role in the criminal justice
system. Some legal scholars and anthropologists caution that under the guise of
enhancing judicial efficiency, plea bargaining represents a form of "uncluttered"
justice that fails to ensure that evidence is evaluated as meticulously as in trials.4 3
With similarity to the issue of jury secrecy, the effect plea bargaining has on the
percentage of cases that go to trial is often criticized as undermining the
legitimacy of the criminal system more broadly." Kevin Washburn writes:
Plea bargaining inhibits transparency, ensuring that criminal justice is run
behind closed doors by insiders (judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
law enforcement officials) and to the exclusion of outsiders (ordinary citizens
and victims) who are left ill-informed about criminal justice. As a result
criminal law is deprived of the legitimacy that juries comprised of ordinary
citizens provide.45
Indeed, the dramatically reduced presence of petit juries means that the "most
important decision point in a criminal case," the "decision whether and what to
charge," rests with the grand jury.4 6 The grand jury thus becomes a de facto trier
of fact.
As a result of plea bargaining, the grand jury is now "likely to be the 'final
step' in a criminal proceeding and the 'sole occasion' for public scrutiny." 47 The
secrecy of grand jury proceedings and high incidence of plea bargaining thus
result in "fewer instances where the prosecutor actually has to prove her facts"
and an increased likelihood that a trial court will "remedy errors left uncorrected."4 8 Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure define plea bargains as

her was later proven to be unreliable and the case was dismissed after Erma served ten years of her prison
sentence.).
42. See Leipold, supra note 40, at 207, 214.
43. See Ross, supra note 40, at 717 ("A number of structural features of the U.S. legal system facilitate the
use of plea bargains as short-cuts to criminal convictions .... First.. . . the adversarial nature of the U.S.
criminal process ... validates convictions as the outcome of a contest between parties rather than a search for
truth .... Second, the absence of a principle of compulsory prosecution ... gives prosecutors convenient leeway in
selecting charges."); CuFFORD GEERrz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
172 (1983) ("[Tlhe expansion of plea-bargaining in criminal cases, which avoids undue exertion in organizing
evidence for all concerned and brings the factual side of things to court largely stipulated.").
44. See generally Washburn, supra note 1 (arguing "the prevalence of plea bargaining has decimated trials
and robbed citizens of opportunities").
45. Id. at 259.
46. See, e.g., Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the NeighborhoodGrandJury, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 2,
at 259.
47. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The GrandJury Legal Advisor: Resurrectingthe GrandJury's Shield, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1207 (2007-2008) (citing Bank ofNova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264-65
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"voluntary" under circumstances where they are not the result of "force,"
"threats" or "extraneous promises," prosecutors' failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence is not viewed as detracting from the "voluntariness of a defendant's
decision to plead guilty." 49
When interviewed, a number of state grand jurors recalled being unaware of
the phenomenon of plea bargaining, viewing grand jury indictments as a small
step in an extended process. The perceived lack of finality of indictments
contributed to a widely held sense that they were not "making decisions affecting
someone's life" directly.so Another grand juror reiterated this sentiment, commenting that grand jurors felt they were "rubber stamps," noting:
[T]he system will take it from there and justice will be done. I don't think there's
an understanding of the implications within judicial process that an indictment
is an indictment that has repercussions on someone's future life and that you do
have an important role to make sure people aren't accused unfairly.5 1
This mindset, the juror added, activated a process of "deferring responsibility" by
which grand jurors relied on "cops, the court, ajudge, or the next jury" rather than
consider the likelihood that they would be the final eyes on a defendant's case.5 2
As Section IV discusses, the existence of plea bargains contributes to a broader
feeling among some grand jurors that their comprehension of their responsibilities as jurors is incomplete at best and based on inaccurate and uncorrected
assumptions at worst.
Before examining the proposals seeking to remedy jurors' informational
deficits, it is instructive to acknowledge aspects of grand jury history that
emphasize its institutional autonomy and community-based legitimacy.
II. A HISTORICIZED VIEW OF THE GRAND JURY THAr EMPOWERS THE JUROR
Literature on grand jury process and reform frequently starts with a narration
of the institution's "historical roots" and "antecedents." 53 While there appears to

(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because of the strict protection of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,
instances of prosecutorial misconduct rarely come to light.")).
49. See Ross, supra note 40, at 719-20; United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002) ("[T]his Court has
found that the Constitution, in respect to a defendant's awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require
complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its
accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a
defendant might labor."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
50. See Interview, supra note 4.
51. Telephone Interview with State Grand Juror, Social Worker with Law Degree (Aug. 11, 2009). Another
interviewee who works as a high school English teacher noted that the experience of being a.grand jurorfelt like
playing the role of a "rubber stamp." Telephone Inteview with State Grand Juror, High School English Teacher
(Aug. 11, 2009).
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See, e.g., LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 7 (1975) ("What are the historical roots of the grand jury, an
institution commanding only hallowed judicial comments? Has it warranted its long-standing reputation as a
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be consensus that one of the first incarnations of the contemporary grand jury
emerged around 1159 under the auspices of King Henry II, historians' emphasis
on periods of grand jury history has differed depending on their aspirations for
the institution's future role. In the Williams opinion, for example, the majority
and dissenting opinions substantiate conceptions of the grand jury's relationship
to the judiciary based on distinct appropriations of a complex and conflicting
historical record." Similarly, references to grand jury secrecy in the ethical rules
draw on a tradition of not disclosing grand jury proceedings to others, including
attorneys dealing with related matters. Despite variation in the retelling, a
common thread in historical discussions of the grand jury is the institution's role
as "voice of the community.""
The conception of grand jurors as producers of localized knowledge about
accused individuals is discernable from a survey of historical materials. Even in
the 12th century, the "evidence" considered by jurors represented an effort to
accumulate anecdotal information about a defendant's reputation and character;
local knowledge of the fama or public fame/rumor remained the "workable
juristic requirement" for charging individuals with crimes through the fourteenth
century. Grand jurors simultaneously assumed the role of judges and witnesses
as they drew on personal impressions of "local reputation, local custom ...
and personal statuses" to assess the validity of an accusation."
Jurors' social and geographic proximity to the accused during the grand jury's
early, English incarnation thus rendered them comparable to participant observdemocratizing and protective agent? Or are there historical antecedents for the current use of the institution as a
political weapon?").
54. FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1123
(London, C.J. Clay and Sons, 1905); J.P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 118 (1960); JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE
CRIMINAL JURY OLD AND NEW: JURY POWER FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 18 (2004) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL JURY].

55. In United States v. Williams, Justice Scalia notes that the grand jury's separation from the judicial branch
is "rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history," adding that that its "institutional relationship with the
Judicial Branch has traditionally been ... at arm's length." 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). The dissent, meanwhile,
invoked the history of the grand jury to support the proposition that the grand jury has a tradition of protecting
citizens "against arbitrary and oppressive government action." Id. at 68 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 342 (1974)).
56. See ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, Current Reports Disciplinary Proceedings, 2
(Dec. 2004); ABA-CJC Terminology, 2 (Aug. 2010) ("'Nonpublic information' means information that is not
available to the public ... [including] information offered in grand jury proceedings ... ."); see also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 8-3.2 (3d ed. 1992) ("Certain proceedings and documents are

'otherwise required to remain confidential' and therefore exempted from the general rule of access. Typical
among these are grand jury proceedings. . . .").
57. See Roger A. Fairfax, Remaking the Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 2, at 331 (citing Susan
W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 67
(1995)).
58. See R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHICAGO L. REv.
620 (1983); Mike Macnair, Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury, 17 L. & HISTORY REV. 574 (1999).
59. Macnair, supra note 58, at 555, 589; JOHN HOSTEITLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 143

(2009).
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ers or "informants" who served as an invaluable link between the king's judges
and their surrounding territories.60 Rather than subject the accused to a trial by
ordeal immediately, the discretion that lay jurors exercised enabled them to give
expression to the values and attitudes of their community on the basis of "what
was reputed in the neighborhood" as well their "prior perceptions" and
subsequent judgment of the locality.61 Georges Lamoine noted that the behavior
valuations inherent in accusations based on rumor made members of the jury
"guardians of public morality," citing descriptions of jurors as "the only Censors
of this Nation" and "Correctors of Manners." 62 For instance, it was not
uncommon for grand jurors to accuse individuals of behavior ranging from
public swearing and drunkenness to spending late-night hours in an ale-house,
frequenting a "bawdy house," or gaming.63 Like today's tabloid journalists and
bloggers, grand jurors became the self-legitimated and publicly exalted gossipers
of their time, maintaining and reinforcing public perceptions of the line between
acceptable and transgressive social behavior. 4
Despite continued (and ironic) allusions to grand jury "history," the grand jury
system was abolished in England in 1933, while remaining part of the United
States' federal and state systems today.65 One of the risks of historicized
justifications for current and proposed reforms for grand jury procedure is the risk
that purportedly "objective" narrations of the grand jury's origin will prevent
honest discussion about favorable changes that should take place.66 While the
Williams holding, with respect to prosecutors' disclosure of exculpatory evidence, represents a view of the grand jury as having a "prosecutorial" model, this
conclusion is neither historically accurate nor analytically inevitable. Its depic-

60. A. Albert Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England,25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (1934).
61. See, e.g., CRIMINAL JURY, supra note 54, at 16, 18 (2004).

62. See, e.g., CHARGES o THE GRAND JuRY 1689-1803 13 (Georges Lamoine ed., 1992).
63. See, e.g., id. at 12.
64. See, e.g., id. at 13.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury"); see Susan Brenner & Lori Shaw, Power to Abolish the
Grand Jury, UNIv. oF DAYTON SCH. OF LAw, http://campus.udayton.edulgrandjur/stategj/abolish.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2011) (noting that twenty-three states including the District of Columbia still require the use of
grand juries to charge particular crimes. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia);
Hoffmeister, supra note 3, at 1174-75 (noting that a majority of states allow prosecutors to use grand juries, and
that the Fifth Amendment requires felony charges to be accompanied by a grand jury's indictment unless this
right is waived by the defendant for a non-capital offense).
66. See Niki Kuckes, Retelling GrandJury History, in GRAND JuRY 2.0, supra note 8, 150 (2010) ("Using
history as ajustification ... has two basic harms .... [I]t masks the Court's true rationale and limits a fuller
debate of the reasons for preferring one model or another. This process should be done consciously, rather than
under the guise of a supposedly uniform historic 'tradition.' .'. . Second . .. the Supreme Court's particular
articulation of grand jury history, in which the lower courts are now largely barred from regulating grand jury
procedures, is a premise that affirmatively blocks the courts' development of more meaningful and workable
rules and threatens to freeze grand jury rules in place.").

2011]

ETHICAL GUIDANCE FOR AGRANDER JURY

773

tion as such, however, precludes meaningful debate about configurations of the
grand jury that might enable it to operate more effectively.6 7 Thus, the Williams
holding that "courts should be largely barred from prescribing grand jury
rules"-in addition to "reflecting a conceptual choice" with a tenuous historical
basis-"threatens to freeze grand jury procedures in their current mold." 6 8
III. PROPOSALS FOR GRAND JURY REFORM WITH AN EMPHASIS ON JUROR
(AND JURY) AUTONOMY
Drawing on the conception of the grand jury as a vehicle for community
involvement, recent proposals for reform have focused on structural changes that
would make the grand jury a more localized, independent body. The use of juries
composed of "neighborhood residents" and the provision of independent counsel
to serve as a buffer between jurors and prosecutors have been topics of continued
discussion. In both cases, the contested narrations of the grand jury's historical
function as well as ethical concerns related to excessive prosecutorial discretion
have guided debate.
A. NEIGHBORHOOD GRAND JURIES
Discourse related to the establishment of "neighborhood" grand juries
emphasizes the extent to which community engagement with the criminal justice
system can be enhanced, and the "historical" function of the grand jury can be
"restored." 69 Though the randomized selection of jurors is meant to create a "fair
cross-section" of the community, critics of juror selection point out that
jurisdictions do not embody communities, and that minority voices and
perspectives can be lost when jurors are randomly pooled from segregated
areas. 70 The connectedness of the grand jury and the local community, in
Washburn's view, would play a key part in the "restoration" of the grand jury's
constitutional purpose.7 1 Drawing on an interpretation of the grand jury as an
"Anti-Federalist check on federal power"-one that contrasts with the prosecutorial model advanced in Williams-Washburn contends that the grand jury serves
as a "barometer of legitimacy," evaluating laws as they are applied to particular

67. Id. at 151-52 ("[F]ederal courts look at arcane details of ancient English practice-and in the process,
render a history that is often selective, cursory and incomplete. The result is neither good history nor good
constitutional interpretation.").
68. Id. at 148, 153.
69. See Lanni, supra note 46, at 172.
70. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 1, at 5.
71. See id. ("Reform proposals ought to be focused ... on making the grand jury less independent of the
people in the local community. Such a shift would not only align the grand jury more closely with its original
constitutional purpose, and serve all communities better. . . .").
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cases. 7 2 To create "neighborhood grand juries," jurisdictions would rely on zip
codes rather than district or "county-wide" jury pools: 7 3
In a society that is far more numerous and much more diverse, we ask too much
from a grand jury that is culled from an entire county or judicial district. The
representation is diluted to the point that the grand jury is effectively
homogenized.7 4
It is only when grand juries are constructed from a zip-code model, Washburn
argues, that they can more closely reflect the voice of the community and honor
their tradition of serving as a check on the illegitimate exercise of authority.
As part of Adriaan Lanni's proposal, truly "localized" grand juries would
provide jurors with opportunities to generate policy recommendations and serve
as "focus groups" that set "policing and prosecution priorities for the neighborhood."7 5 In addition to reviewing individual plea bargains and helping "articulate
some of the criteria that influence charging and bargaining policies," grand juries
can issue recommendations about the severity or leniency of the punishments that
accompany particular charges. 76 With increased jury participation in policymaking and decisions underlying criminal prosecutions, the hope is that criminal laws
and sentences will more closely track the public opinion of individuals in the
communities from which criminal charges are brought."
B. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR GRAND JURORS AND JURY
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
A number of scholars have proposed strengthening grand jurors' autonomy by
advocating for a more widespread use of a "Grand Jury Legal Advisor"
(GJLA).78 The GJLA's primary responsibility would be to "provide grand jurors
unbiased answers to their questions,"7 though secondary rationales include the
need for an "impartial" or "honest broker," to ensure that grand jury procedures

72. Id. at 6, 46 ("To restore this role, we need not change the way the grand jury works; we merely need to
change the way the grand jury is constructed.").
73. Id. at 47 ("A grand jury that is more localized could replicate the kind of community that existed when
the Bill of Rights came into being and could meet the constitutionally-intended purposes of the grand jury
requirement much better. . . .").
74. Id. at 48 ("The problem with a homogenized grand jury is that it fails to serve 'the same role as the grand
jury at the time of the founding which represented a modest-sized community of similarly situated people.").
75. See Lanni, supra note 46, at 175, 184.
76. Id. at 185. Lanni points out that the grand jury's advisory input could be helpful for "controversial"
crimes, including those related to "quality of life," "statutory rape," or "non-violent drug offenses," where
different policy priorities might cause sentences to differ widely.
77. Id. at 186.
78. See Hoffmeister, supra note 2, at 1177; Washburn, supra note 1, at 3 (citing Akhil Amar, Reinventing
Juries: Ten Suggestions, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1169, 1185 (1995)).
79. See Hoffmeister, supra note 2, at 1177 (noting that it is not the Grand Jury Legal Advisor's role to
advocate on behalf of particular parties but rather to serve as a resource at the grand jurors' disposal).
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operate fairly. 80 Without independent counsel for grand jurors, scholars warn,
prosecutors "control every aspect of the process save for voting on the actual
indictment" and can circumvent existing checks on the off-the-record opinions
and advice prosecutors share with grand jurors.81 The GJLA is currently being
utilized to great effect by the State of Hawaii and by the military.8 2
In light of the relative scarcity of criminal trials, another proposal for jury
reform calls for the integration of jurors in the plea bargaining process. In her
article advocating for a "plea jury," Laura Appleman argues that juror involvement in plea negotiation would facilitate greater community involvement in
criminal procedure, and effectuate the Sixth Amendment values that are
otherwise lost in the absence of a trial.8 4 Rather than keep plea negotiations
relegated to an "unregulated" negotiation between a prosecutor and defense
attorney, Appleman envisions a key role of the plea jury as listening to the
defendant's explanation of his offense to determine "whether the factual basis
admitted by the defendant matched the original charged crimes, whether the plea
was knowing, willing and voluntary, and whether the proffered sentence was
appropriate."8 In the process of "restoring the community's voice" to criminal
proceedings, Appleman notes the importance of the "educative function" of jury
work, as increased public "understanding" of criminal justice process is valuable
in its own right. 86 Educating members of the community, she suggests, reinforces
the values underlying retributive justice because it creates a greater likelihood
that defendants will understand their charges as well.
Drawing on Appleman's analysis, Professor Fairfax suggests that many
advantages of the "plea jury" could be achieved by reinforcing community
involvement in grand juries as they are currently configured. Fairfax also notes
80. Id. at 1178.
81. Id. at 1184 (noting that this practice has caused some to question the necessity of the grand jury
altogether in light of these obstacles to its "intended function of being the voice of the community").
82. Id. at 1215 (citing HAw. CONsT. art. I § 11) (The amendment, which was ratified in 1978, reads:
"Whenever a grand jury is impaneled, there shall be an independent counsel appointed as provided by law to
advice the members of the grand jury regarding matters brought before it. Independent counsel shall be selected
from among those persons licensed to practice law by the supreme court of the State and shall not be a public
employee. The term and compensation for independent counsel shall be as provided by law.").
83. Laura 1.Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731,733 (2010) (noting that "the current configuration of
the criminal guilty plea leave no room for the community's voice").
84. Id. at 741 ("With our heavy use of guilty pleas ... it is important that substantive, theoretical values are
integrated into the actual processes of the criminal system.").
85. Id. at 749.
86. Id. at 758-59, 763 (suggesting that participation as "plea jurors" would allow members of the community
to "better understand how the system adjudicates and punishes crime, which will provide ... an educative
function"). Appleman also notes the extent to which public involvement in plea negotiation encourages a
"morality play" in which the public administration of justice gives expressive visibility and legitimacy to an
aspect of criminal justice process that reinforces social and "legal norms." Id. at 47.
87. Id. at 761.
88. Telephone Interview with Roger Fairfax, Professor of Law, George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. (Sept. 24,
2010); Fairfax, supra note 57, at 335.
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that nothing in the Constitution prevents grand jurors from playing a greater role
in policymaking and plea negotiation.
IV JURORS' INFORMATIONAL DEFICIT AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO
GRAND JURY LEGITIMACY
One of the grand jury's greatest limitations is the extent to which jurors are
denied knowledge of their responsibilities as well as an accurate sense of their
role in a larger criminal justice process. Despite the fact that the ability to make
discretionary decisions is an institutionally significant part of the grand jury's
delineated power, jurors are rarely provided with the information necessary to
exercise this power in individual cases. 90 If the grand jury exercised its
discretion, Fairfax suggests, citizen participation could be enhanced in a manner
"the system sorely lacks in this age of ubiquitous guilty pleas."91 Indeed, grand
jurors are too frequently given instructions warning of the limitations of their
powers rather than their ability to exercise them.92
Some of the most revealing expressions of frustration about the inadequacy of
grand juror preparation and orientation come from jurors themselves. In rare
cases, grand jurors have published personal accounts of their experiences,
highlighting the daunting process by which they are transformed from randomly
selected citizens with disrupted day jobs to jurors obligated to serve two days per
week for over a year.93
Professor Susan Brenner of the University of Dayton School of Law, who has
spent the past decade operating an informal website on the federal grand jury,
fields numerous questions from empanelled grand jurors who struggle to
understand their obligations. 94 Citing several of these correspondences, Professor
Brenner described a foreperson's confusion about federal grand jury procedure.
The juror wrote in an email:
Many of my fellow jurors do not seem to clearly understand their responsibility
as a grand juror and seem to be aligned with whatever the U.S. Attorneys
present or want.. . .I would like to take some time to educate or discuss with

89. See Fairfax, supranote 57, at 335.
90. See Roger A. Fairfax, Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and Useful Role to Play in
CriminalJustice?, in GRAND JuRY 2.0, supra note 2, at 80 ("Recognition of the grand jury's discretion may very
well strengthen the grand jury as an institution, and a fortified grand jury may enhance the individual liberties it
serves to protect.").
91. Id. at 80.
92. See Michael D. Hawkins, Honoring the Voice of the Citizen: Breathing Life into the Grand Jury
Requirement,in GRAND JuRY 2.0, supra note 2, at 117 (noting that grand jurors are routinely told, for instance,
that they cannot consider the policies behind and the punishments that accompany particular crimes).
93. See, e.g., BLANCHE DAvis BLANK, THE NOT So GRAND JuRY 1-4 (1993).
94. See Susan Brenner & Lori Shaw, Federal Grand Jury, UNiv. OF DAYTON SCH. OF LAw, http://
campus.udayton.edulgrandjur/index.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
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the grand jurors our responsibilities, as I am sure that most have forgotten them
from the time they were initially given the grand jury charge.95
Despite the foreperson's understanding that the jury was left alone during
deliberation, she did not know whether it might be permissible to discuss the
jury's "responsibilities" during a discrete period of time, and apart from the U.S.
attorneys and court reporter. 9 6 Brenner found the email notable for its implication
that providing structural opportunities for grand jurors to share knowledge might
"advance the operational independence of the grand jury."9 7
Interviews with individuals who served as state grand jurors reveal consensus
that they frequently felt they lacked a basic understanding of their responsibilities
with respect to the accused. One practicing attorney who served as a grand juror
commented that he did not "remember ... having any kind of orientation or
instruction .. . I don't really have a recollection of being told what we were going
to do beforehand." 98 He did note, however, "It was pretty clear in the minds of the
grand jurors it wasn't our job to weigh the evidence." 99 A recent college graduate
who served as a state grand juror echoed this impression, noting that few jurors
"understood what [their] role was in the legal system.""' She recalled:
I don't think they told us very much. I remember being confused, went home,
and researched it on Wikipedia. They sort of said that guilt is determined at a
later time and you're just deciding if there's enough evidence to go forward
with the case which implicitly suggested that we should be voting yes with all
the cases ... .101
In light of the reported satisfaction felt by grand jurors who are engaged with
their work and the sense of procedural justice implicit in enhanced juror
participation,10 2 federal and state grand juries would be wise to invest greater
attention to the process of training and acculturating jurors. 10 3 One solution,
Fairfax suggests, could involve a change in the language of grand jury
instructions:
An empanelling judge will typically charge the grand jurors that if they find
probable cause in a case, they should indict. A simple shift to language

95. Susan W. Brenner, GrandJurorsSpeak, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 2, at 38-39.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 38.
98. Telephone Interview with State Grand Juror, Attorney (Aug. 6, 2009).
99. Id.
100. Telephone Interview with State Grand Juror, Recent Coll. Graduate, supra note 4.
101. Id.
102. See Simmons, supra note 30, at 243 ("[I]n order to obtain any benefits of the grand jury system, real
reforms are needed. Grand juries must be engaged in their work; they must hear sufficiently detailed
presentations from prosecutors . . . .").
103. See Fairfax,supra note 57, at 82.
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informing grand jurors that they may indict if they find probable cause would
enhance the grand jury's discretionary role. 104
Fairfax notes that in addition to instructing grand jurors about their discretion to
request further evidence in cases, they should be reminded of their "own
investigative prerogative" and the clear limits on prosecutorial discretion. 05
Another approach to increasing jurors' understanding of their responsibilities
might focus on ensuring the forepersonhas access to materials defining aspects of
grand jury procedure that might aid her in the day-to-day mechanics of
facilitating jury deliberation and voting.106 The Northern District of Illinois, for
instance, offers a handbook specifically written for the foreperson, acknowledging the importance of attempting "to explain grand jury duty and its inherent
responsibilities and duties in more general terms" to aid with "day to day aspects
of managing a grand jury."10 7 Implicit in Illinois' release of a specialized manual
for the foreperson is a sense that jurors benefit from a non-prosecutor source of
authority to clarify aspects of grand jury procedure not contained in other
orientation materials. If a handbook for forepersons was available in more
jurisdictions, information pertaining to exculpatory evidence and extent of grand
jury discretion might aid a number of grand jurors.
V. PROPOSED ADDITION TO JUDICIAL ETHICAL RULES THAT WOULD
ENCOURAGE SUSTAINED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF GRAND JUROR EDUCATION

In light of the grand jury's procedural transformation since September 11,
2001, including variation in requirements related to the disclosure of exculpatory
evidence and the presence of plea bargaining, it is critical to the grand jury's
effectiveness that jurors understand the extent of their discretion and responsibilities. The expansion of jurors' familiarity with the "myriad rules and procedures
governing the grand jury system" as well as the "expectations and legal
requirements applicable to grand jurors" is already a prominent feature of
recommendations for grand jury improvement; 08 when grand jurors were

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Brenner,supra note 21.
107. Grand Jury Foreperson'sHandbook, UNrrED STATEs DisTRicr COURT FOR THE DisTRicr OF ILLINOIS,
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/JURY/Grndjury.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) (noting that the Foreperson's
Handbook would "not simply be a duplication of that contained in the 'Handbook for Grand Jurors"').
108. See, e.g., COUNCI FOR CoURTr EXCELLENCE, DisTRIcr OF COLUMBIA GRAND JURY STUDY COMMITEE, THE
GRAND JURY OF TOMORROW: NEw LIFE FOR AN ARCHAIC INsTITUTION (2001) [hereinafter COUNCIL FOR COURT
EXCELLENCE] ("Currently, citizens summoned for grand jury service do not always appreciate the significant
differences between grand and petit jury service. This can result in unnecessary anxiety and misunderstandings
about the expectations and legal requirements applicable to grand jurors. User-friendly information will
promote effective functioning of the grand jury and will make citizens more at ease as they perform their civic
duty.").
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interviewed in the District of Columbia, all of them recommended that "more
information" be made available throughout the duration of their jury service:
They described remarks made by the Chief Judge or his designee on the first
day of service as helpful and informative, but more limited than desirable and,
because not presented in writing, quickly forgotten. They also described the
initial orientation by the U.S. Attorney's Office as instructive and helpful, but
again unwritten and of limited usefulness. They saw an orientation movie but
did not remember its contents. 09
Jurors also noted that to perform their duties "comfortably and effectively" they
needed more time to review orientation materials before reporting for service.'" 0
Recommendations for grand jury reform have specifically focused on the
content of judicial instructions to members of the grand jury at the start of their
service."' In its 2001 report, the Council for Court Excellence, for instance,
noted that prosecutors' presentation of exculpatory evidence was important to
jurors' understanding of the cases before them.112 The proposed addition to the
D.C. Superior Court's grand jury charge would provide grand jurors access to
"documents and other tangible evidence that might bear on either the guilt or the
innocence of an accused.""i3
As the divided opinion on the disclosure of exculpatory evidence suggests,
however, greater judicial involvement with juror orientation could provide jurors
a clearer understanding of their duties. While ethical debates surrounding the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence are difficult to resolve, relatively simple
adjustments could address concerns that current jury orientation procedures leave
grand jurors unprepared and therefore less effective as a check on the just
enforcement of criminal laws. Even if substantive changes are not made to grand
jury orientation instructions, jurors might benefit from hearing instructions
repeated to them more frequently, or presented in a different order so that they
could better retain the information.11 4 Judges should instruct jurors on which
resources they may properly consult as questions arise, and who-if not the
prosecutor-might be available to address substantive or procedural questions.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 34.
111. See, e.g., Fairfax,supra note 57, at 82 ("Of course, the most direct method [of informing grand jurors
about their discretion] would involve informing the grand jurors ... when they are empanelled and sworn at the
beginning of their terms of service. An empanelling judge will typically charge the grand jurors that if they find
probable cause in a case, they should indict. A simple shift to language informing grand jurors that they may
indict if they find probable cause would enhance the grand jury's discretionary role.").
112. See COUNCIL FOR COURr EXCELLENCE, supra note 89, at 35-36 ("[W]e believe that the Grand Jury
Charge, consistent with Bill S. 2289 introduced in the Second Session of the 105th Congress by Senator Dale
Bumpers, should apprise grand jurors of their right to . . . be apprised of any exculpatory evidence.").
113. Id. at 36.
114. Telephone Interview with Kevin Washburn, Dean, Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Law (Sept. 25, 2010).
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Though judges frequently participate in the initial training of grand jurors in
both state and federal court,115 the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is silent on
the extent to which judges may serve as a sustained resource for grand jurors,
ensuring that the grand juries understand the implications of their indictments in a
post-9/11 context of plea bargaining.116 The absence of an unambiguously
interpreted ethical rule, in conjunction with the Williams court's refusal to impose
ethical obligations on prosecutors, may signal the need for judges to play a more
active role in grand juror training.x11
Indeed, judges' "direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury"
including the "constitutive" role of "calling grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office," would also be consistent with Justice Scalia's
(controversial) historicized vision of a separate grand jury and "Judicial Branch"
articulated in Williams.118 Legal scholar Niki Kuckes observes: "The longstanding federal judicial practice of instructing the grand jury-and through
those instructions, shaping the procedures that the grand jury will follow-is hard
to distinguish from the exercise of supervisory authority decried in Williams."1 19
The grand jury system would benefit from the incorporation of language in the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct encouraging judges to meet with jurors
periodically or revise their orientation materials to reflect the availability of
exculpatory evidence in some instances, as well as the reality that the vast
majority of defendants who face indictment will not automatically face trial. In
the absence of independent counsel for grand juries in most jurisdictions, the
judiciary appropriately assumes responsibility for jurors' comprehension of the
model charges they receive and the significance of the oaths administered to

115. See Hoffmeister, supra note 2, at 1181 (noting that grand jurors' receipt of instructions by the judge is
"one of the few times that grand jurors receive guidance from anyone other than the prosecutor"); Interview
with Stevan Bunnell, Former Prosecutor in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 1, 2010) (noting the common practice by which
the Chief Judge handled introductory and procedural matters at the start of grand jurors' service); Interview with
Joseph Bowman, Assistant Bar Counsel, D.C. Office of the Bar Counsel, in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 21, 2010) (noting
that the effect of empowering grand jurors with information about the reality of plea bargaining may be
uncertain; while some jurors may approach deliberation more thoughtfully and thoroughly, others may conclude
that plea bargaining may be a better indication of the guilt of prosecuted individuals who actually have
committed the crimes for which they are charged).
116. ABA MODEL CODE OF JuDICIAL CoNDxicr (2008).
117. See R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the
Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 361, 366 (2000).
118. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 ("Judges' direct involvement in the functioning of the grand
jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering
their oaths of office.").
119. See Kuckes, supra note 66, at 153 (citing United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1186, 1193
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that delivering grand jury instructions does not violate the grand jury's independence)).
The Navarro-VargasCourt divided grand jury history into four decisive periods: the "Early English Grand Jury"
which served as a "Quasi-Prosecutor"; the "Colonial Grand Jury," which was "Quasi-Legislative" and
"Quasi-Administrative"; the "Post-Revolutionary" "screening" grand jury; and finally, the "Modem Grand
Jury." "Looking over this record," the court concluded, "we observe that the weight of U.S. history favors
instructing the grand jury to follow the law without judging its wisdom."
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them. As one legal scholar queried: "Without an understanding of its power, how
can the grand jury really assert itself?" 12 0 Just as critics of plea bargaining argue a
guilty plea "cannot be considered voluntary unless the defendant is aware of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of the plea, 12 1 indictments gain
legitimacy when grand jurors are equipped with knowledge of the discretion
underlying their power to indict.

120. See, e.g., Ovio C. Lewis, The GrandJury:A CriticalEvaluation, 13 AKRON L. REv. 33, 34 (1979).
121. See Appleman, supra note 83, at 752.

